the ethics of poverty alleviation
salzburg, august 28 & 29, 2014

keynote speakers:
sabina alkire
darrel moellendorf

www.uni-salzburg.at/zea/poverty
Welcome to the University of Salzburg!

The Paris Lodron University of Salzburg is the largest educational institution in the Salzburg region. Presently, over 18,000 students are enrolled and it employs approximately 2,700 staff members in research, teaching and administration. As an integral part of both cultural and educational life, the University serves as a meeting place for teaching staff, students and academics, as well as the general public. Since our re-establishment in 1962, the University has developed into a modern, vibrant institution whose four Faculties (Theology, Law, Cultural and Social Sciences, and Natural Sciences) meet the highest standards of teaching and research.

The conference will take place at the Centre for Ethics and Poverty Research, which is located upon the Moenchsberg, a small mountain, directly in the city center of Salzburg. Address: Moenchsberg 2a, 5020 Salzburg

The conference dinner will take place in the Restaurant Stieglkeller, just beneath the Festung Hohensalzburg. Address: Festungsgasse 10, 5020 Salzburg

Salzburg

Salzburg is the fourth-largest city in Austria with about 150,000 inhabitants and the capital city of the federal state of Salzburg. Its „Old Town“ (Altstadt) (listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1997) has internationally renowned baroque architecture and a beautiful alpine setting. The most famous son of Salzburg is the 18th-century composer Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and many have seen and heard the musical and film The Sound of Music. You can visit many different museums, churches or the fortress Hohensalzburg, one of the largest medieval castles in Europe. But Salzburg is not only about culture and music, it also has three universities and a large population of students.
Centre for Ethics and Poverty Research

The Centre for Ethics and Poverty Research (ZEA) at the University of Salzburg is an interdisciplinary research organization with multiple integrations in national and international institutions and networks. It is dedicated to the scientific treatment of social-ethical issues with particular reference to the phenomena of poverty and social exclusion. The aim of the ZEA is the promotion, recognition and establishment of poverty research as a separate scientific discipline.

The ZEA assumes social responsibility. It holds that the university as well as the scientific research and intellectual work have a social responsibility. This can be justified with reference to the university’s own history as well as the self-understandings of intellectuals. This social responsibility comes to effect in collaborations with organisations and people outside the university. Having the privilege to work in science implies that we carry a responsibility. Universities and scientific research have to contribute importantly to the urgent social problems by the tools of analysis and by the quest for helpful solutions.

The ZEA’s self-understanding that it is a coordination point of work in the areas of poverty research and applied ethics. Through events, workshops, conferences, projects, publications, consulting and networking, the Centre for Ethics and Poverty Research tries to transfer scientific knowledge to the public, business and political discussions.

Research focus: Culture and Poverty Alleviation

The issue of poverty includes not only financial resource allocation issues, but also covers social issues. As part of the research for culture and poverty reduction, the relationship between culture and poverty is systematically reflected. Culture, we understand both in a narrow sense of creative artistic expression (and its reception) and in a broader sense, thus as the cultural practices of social life and their effects on individuals. In the context of poverty and poverty alleviation, we ask for meaning, function and effect of culture in terms of cultural (and therefore social) inclusion and exclusion.

- What knowledge about poverty is present in local cultures? How can local knowledge inform poverty research and stimulate poverty alleviation?
- What micro theories can we derive good practices for the further development of poverty research and the alleviation of poverty?
- What is the relationship between cultural participation, cultural capital and poverty?
- What cultural activities can contribute to poverty reduction?
Research focus: Theory of Poverty and Normative Ethics

Issues of poverty are traditionally located at empirically-working social and economic sciences rather than at philosophy and normative ethics. Nevertheless, a theory of poverty as well as the basics of poverty research and alleviation must be rooted in normative and evaluative concepts and assumptions. Decisions about the concept of poverty and the "correct" operationalisation are often not sufficiently reflected in a relationship with normative theoretical assumptions. The same holds true for the normative question, why we should alleviate poverty at all. Such assumptions concern understandings of justice, the good life or the common good.

A philosophical theorizing and reflection can help clarify key terms and concepts of poverty and to establish a better understanding of the goals and methods of poverty alleviation. The normative and evaluative research on such issues as a core task of philosophy is therefore also granted wide space at the ZEA. It is an essential part of self-understanding and the work of the ZEA, that poverty is not a solitary agenda of philosophy, but can only be tackled usefully if they are treated in the inter and intra disciplinary conversation.

Research focus: Poverty Reduction and Tax Ethics

In the research area, Poverty Reduction and Tax Ethics, the ZEA studies the systematic relationship between the tax system, tax reform and poverty. The key questions asked are: How do tax reforms affect the lives of the poor? What relationship between tax policy and poverty alleviation programs can be observed in selected European countries? What recommendations can be given for tax measures in the context of a clear social ethical position, and on the basis of data?

Between taxes on the one hand and welfare benefits on the other hand, there is the entire welfare state structure. All the key issues raised are therefore necessary embedded in the context of the welfare state and must be analyzed and evaluated within this reference system. The ZEA does so by applying methods of empirical social research and within the discourse of normative ethics. As a first step, we follow the ethical justification of welfare taxation in the context of social justice and the alleviation of poverty by welfare programs. In the course of this research, we identify problem areas of ethical evaluation of principals of taxation, as they are provided in the control sciences, and thus prepare the field for further in-depth research questions and ideas.

We cooperate with the Universities’ focal area „Law, Economics and Labour”, the Department of Economics at the university, Law Faculty and numerous other researchers from the University of Salzburg in the context of book projects and expert discussions.
The Ethics of Poverty Alleviation

The aim of this conference is to explore the ethical issues concerned with the conceptualisation, design and implementation of poverty alleviation measures from the local to the global level. It wants to bring together these topics with the ongoing debates on global justice and to ask what an ethical or normative philosophical perspective can add to the social scientific, economic and political approaches that dominate poverty alleviation.

Key Themes and Questions

- Global and local justice and poverty
- Sufficiency and basic needs
- Capabilities, functionings and justice
- Responsibilities towards the poor
- Concepts of relative and absolute poverty
- Poverty, health and well-being
- Poverty and modern capitalism
- Poverty and the welfare state
- Poverty measurement and domains of poverty
- Child poverty and disadvantage
- Ethics of development and policies

Organising Committee

Helmut P. Gaisbauer – Elisabeth Kapferer – Andreas Koch – Otto Neumaier
Gottfried Schweiger – Clemens Sedmak
# Program

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<td>Ndidi Nwaneri</td>
<td>Revealed Contradictions: The Positive Relationship Between Global Poverty and Global Consumption</td>
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<td>Rootedness: The contribution of the founding fathers of German Social Market Economy to the discussion about the achievement of human well-being</td>
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<td>Who owes what to the very poor? Towards a conception of meta-responsibility</td>
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<td>Rachelle Bascara</td>
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<td>Relative poverty, absolute poverty and the unjust background structure</td>
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<td>Tanja Munk</td>
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<td>Jan Deckers</td>
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<td>Juliane Liebsch</td>
<td>A minimal standard of justice: the alleviation of harm and the protection of human dignity</td>
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Important Information

Conference Venue:
Centre for Ethics and Poverty Research
Edith-Stein-Haus
Mönchsberg 2a
A-5020 Salzburg

How to get there:
The Centre is located directly in the center of Salzburg. You can either walk up the stairs from the Toscaninihof on the Mönchsberg or use the elevator located 50 meters inside the mountain on the way from the Toscaninihof to the garage. You can access the elevator using the door code: 1756#. The Centre is in the Edith-Stein-Haus, the smaller building opposite of the Edmundsburg.

Conference Dinner:
Die Stadtalm
Mönchsberg 19c
A-5020 Salzburg

How to get there:
The Stadtalm is also located on the Mönchsberg and just a 15 minutes walk from the conference venue.
Important Information

Meeting Point for the City Tour:
Toscaninihof
09.00 am on Friday

Meeting Point to walk together to the Conference Dinner:
Centre for Ethics and Poverty Research
7.30 pm on Friday

Wlan:
Network: Plus
Username: epa2014
Password: epA20!4

Emergence Numbers:
Fire Department: 122
Police: 133
Ambulance: 144

Organization Team:
cepr@sbg.ac.at
+43 (0) 662 8044 2570
Opening Keynote

Darrel Moellendorf, darrel.moellendorf@normativeorders.net
Exzellenzcluster Normative Orders, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

Energy Poverty and the Moral Challenge of Dangerous Climate Change

The chief objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is to prevent “dangerous anthropogenic interference in the climate system” (Article 2). Attempts by natural and social scientists to identify dangerous climate change have failed to appreciate that danger in this context is a normative concept. Climate change is risky, but that which is dangerous is that which we have good reason to avoid. Because climate change and energy policy affect the well-being of billions of people, our reasons for the pursuit of a climate change policy involve moral values. Whether there is good reason in favor of a particular mitigation policy depends on its effects on the global poor. Human development depends upon inexpensive access to energy. Over one billion people live in energy poverty without access to modern energy. Most burn biomass for fuel, which causes indoor pollution and is a public health problem rivaling that of HIV and tuberculosis. Fossil fuels, especially coal, are for most of the world the cheapest form of energy. But an international climate change mitigation regime is very likely to discourage use of fossil fuels and encourage innovation in renewable energy by raising the price of fossil fuels. Any additional loss access to energy for the global poor is also dangerous. A morally acceptable international climate change regime must insure that the poor are not burdened by loss of access to inexpensive energy. This places the responsibility on the most highly developed states to shoulder the bulk of the costs of a global energy transition.
Closing Keynote

Sabina Alkire, ophi@qeh.ox.ac.uk
Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), University of Oxford

Normative Issues in Poverty Measurement

The design of poverty measures - whether unidimensional or multidimensional - entails a series of choices. The choices relate to the space of the measure, its indicators, cut-offs, weights, and poverty line. This presentation describes those choices, and outlines alternative ways that they might be understood, made and justified for poverty measures that are used to inform policy. While these choices are general to measures of poverty and well-being, and also are used with different multidimensional measurement techniques, this presentation articulates the issues with reference to choices made in designing multidimensional poverty measures. As this presentation also pro-actively seeks to support those making such design choices, and also includes one or more examples of how these might be stated.
Abstracts


Timothy Weidel, timothy.weidel@okstate.edu
Oklahoma State University

David Schweickart, dschwei@luc.edu
Loyola University Chicago

Ndidi Nwaneri, ndidikan@gmail.com
Loyola University Chicago

In this panel, we will make connections between economic approaches to the problem of poverty, the philosophical justifications for such approaches, and the underpinnings of why the average person should feel motivated to get involved in the project of poverty alleviation.

In the first paper, Ndidi Nwaneri examines a neglected aspect of the field of international development, and how it can be improved to better achieve its stated goal of minimizing the amount of people living in absolute poverty. The contradictory nature of international development is such that it presupposes the possibility of meeting the needs of majority of the global poor while maintaining both the consumption patterns of the Global North, as well as the proportion or share of global resources that the rich consume. Nwaneri illustrates the contradictory nature of these two presuppositions by first arguing that the structure of the global economic and financial system is not capable of accommodating the poverty reduction strategies that are needed to reduce the levels of absolute poverty. Even assuming an increase in worldwide resources, the distribution of global resources between the rich and the poor precludes the reduction of absolute poverty. A genuine commitment to eradicating, or at least drastically reducing, the numbers the global poor requires a fundamental change in our current financial and economic structures, both at the micro and the macro levels.

Focusing on macro-level economic concerns in the second paper, David Schweickart argues that the causes of poverty run deeper than either ineffective governmental involvement or a lack of philanthropy on the part of the rich in developed nations. Despite the enormous economic and technological progress brought about by capitalism, grinding poverty in the face of unpreceden-
The ethics of poverty alleviation cannot be solved within the framework of a globalized capitalist economy. Schweickart proposes an alternative: Economic Democracy, a form of market socialism that goes beyond the failings of the capitalist model. Rather than encouraging cutthroat global competition, a lowering of trade barriers, and rampant unemployment, Economic Democracy democratizes labor and capital in production, rendering it compatible with a world without poverty. Implementing such a system-wide change will not only correct the structural causes of poverty, but will also allow citizens of developed countries to provide poor people with the tools they need to help themselves, at the same time respecting their autonomy.

But reform proposals, however drastic, do not address the question of moral motivation: Why should the average person in the West feel morally compelled to do anything to help the poor? Various answers to this question have been constructed—and yet poverty persists. In the third paper, Timothy Weidel argues that, among other difficulties, the current approaches to the problem of poverty overlook a critical element: that poverty not only harms the poor, it harms every human being. Its existence forces us to live in a world where we are compelled by a pervasive ideology to eviscerate our own humanity and neglect our human impulses. Given such harm, Weidel claims that our moral motivation for acting to help the poor and fight against global poverty should come not from feelings of guilt about how poverty harms them, but rather a recognition that poverty is harming all of us.

Thus our panel explores the realities of international development at the micro level, potential structural alterations that render our economic systems compatible with a world without poverty, and alternative philosophical arguments for why the average person should feel compelled to engage in the project of combatting global poverty.
Session 1b: Poverty and the Welfare State

Claudia Globisch, Claudia.Globisch@uibk.ac.at
University of Innsbruck

Andreas Hirseland, Andreas.Hirseland@iab.de
Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung (IAB)

Context matters: being poor in a rich country

It’s a widespread prejudice that poverty is foremost related to economy. Focusing primarily on economical aspects has great impact on defining poverty as well as on legitimizing certain ways of poverty policies.

This can for instance be seen in charging up the situation of the poor in rich countries against those in poor countries. Based on empirical findings drawn from a longitudinal study undertaken in Germany during 2007 until 2012 („Labour market and dynamics of poverty“) and a comparative study in Austria („Dynamics of poverty in Tyrol“) after the latest welfare reforms (Hartz IV, BMS), we want to stress a notion of poverty that is related to the meaning attached to the situation of being poor by the recipients of the respective poverty benefits.

Our findings show that the feeling of being poor is a matter of social and institutional positions attributed to those who are regarded as ‘the poor’. Looking at the relation between social experience and powerful institutional and discoursive frames of reference we will argue that the phenomenon of poverty is not only a matter of given resources but of context. Looking at poverty from this angle might contribute to the development of ethical and normative positions towards poverty alleviation appropriate to the ongoing neoliberal change of societies and poverty policies.

Daniel Halliday, daniel.halliday@unimelb.edu.au

Serena Romano, serena.romano@unina.it
Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II

Ethics, poverty and moralisation in the Hungarian welfare state: beyond austerity?

Consumption taxes are often used to encourage citizens to reduce or avoid un-While it is now commonly acknowledged that the identification of “the deserving poor” (or the “deserving welfare client”) is mainly constructed upon specific ideas concerning deservedness, merit, need and social justice, there is still little scientific interest in the relationships between the ethical foundations of policy
design and the potential distributive implications for a given population. The normative orientations underlying social policy transformations have become even more relevant as austerity measures are being implemented across Europe. The discussion presented here draws predominantly upon the analysis of the transformations in the Hungarian anti-poverty system during the economic crisis (2007-2013), that I conducted at the TARKI Social Institute in Budapest. The study involved three different levels of investigation: a qualitative assessment of the legislative transformations in Hungarian anti-poverty programmes over the last five years, used for understanding the main directions of anti-poverty policy change; interviews with policy makers, which provide material for discussing how reforms are designed and legitimised at the institutional level; eventually, a quantitative examination of data (TARKI Household Monitor Survey on Hungarian living conditions, waves of 2007, 2009 and 2012 and EU-SILC data on severe material deprivation) is used to describe the main distributive transformations. Eventually, the findings of such combined approach will be summarised and the relationships between moralization, austerity, poverty and welfare reforms in Hungary will be discussed.

Helmut P. Gaisbauer, helmut.gaisbauer@sbg.ac.at
University of Salzburg

Elisabeth Kapferer, elisabeth.kapferer@sbg.ac.at
University of Salzburg

Tackling visible poverty in affluent societies

One eminent aim of poverty research is to make poverty visible in terms of ideas and concepts. Only if conceptualized adequately it is possible to analyze poverty as a condition of life, with regard to its causes, its prevalence and its consequences, and, finally, to think about poverty alleviation. Referring to this a paradox can be found in the affluent societies of Europe or Northern America: People living in well visible, different forms of poverty (e.g. beggars, homeless people, street children) are invisible as poverty-stricken people at the same time in manifold ways: they remain invisible in poverty statistics, in the conceptualizations of poverty preferentially used by academia as well as in the praxis of social policy or in political and public discourse. They are hence effectively excluded from these societies based on the principle of solidarity. In our presentation we analyze the striking invisibility of visible poverty by addressing current conceptualizations of poverty coming into effect (scholarly terms and definitions as well as images and stereotypes) and by tracing their capacity and the way they are linked and
intertwined. By doing this we aim at unveiling some blind spots of predominant discourse on poverty in- and outside academia.

Session 2a: Poverty, Self and Community

Christine Schliesser, christine.schliesser@uzh.ch
Zurich University

On a long neglected player: The religious factor in poverty alleviation. The example of the so-called “prosperity gospel” in Africa

International politics regards the alleviation of poverty as both desirable and doable – the glaring gap between the millennium goals and reality notwithstanding. However, various attempts in poverty alleviation theory and practice have mostly neglected the following crucial factor: the religious dimension (cf. Imhof 2012). My paper elaborates this thesis by focusing on the African context and the valuable resources African religious communities and movements can provide in the struggle against poverty. One particularly influential streak of present-time African religiousness serves as a study-case: the so-called “Prosperity Gospel” as part of Pentecostal Christianity, which is “at present (not only) in Africa, … possibly the most dynamic religious mass movement” (Heuser 2013). The theological profile of the “Prosperity Gospel” includes an active social impetus by refusing to spiritualize poverty and transforming material possessions into a Christian virtue and token of divine grace. This corresponds with a heightened sensitivity for social responsibility and various “social ministries” as active and concrete engagement against poverty (Miller/Yamamori 2007).

My paper is structured into three parts: I will first briefly outline the formative influence of religion on African conceptions of self, other and world, before critically assessing the theological and practical impact of the “Prosperity Gospel” on concrete and effective poverty alleviation. A third part situates the insights gained into a wider perspective, seeking ways to integrate the religious factor into a more holistic conception of and engagement against poverty.
Poverty and the regulative idea of the Soul

Immanuel Kant suggested a regulative idea of the soul for the purposes of practical ethics. The talk explores some implications of this epistemological as well as motivational strategy for the project of poverty alleviation. What difference does it make to consider human beings as persons with interiority and depth? This understanding of the human person (providing a “thick account” of the soul) has been reconstructed by Charles Taylor’s “Sources of the Self” as an Augustinian turn at the end of the 4th century. The talk reconstructs this milestone in the history of ideas and suggests some consequences for the understanding of poverty and – using some concrete examples from poverty alleviation efforts – for the conceptualization of poverty alleviation. The claim defended is the following: Sustainable alleviation of poverty requires a deep understanding of the human person.

Rootedness: The contribution of the founding fathers of German Social Market Economy to the discussion about the achievement of human well-being

The possibility of a fulfilled life could be defined as an explicit ethical objective of poverty alleviation. Such a definition is already expressed in diverse authors and contexts, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the basic principles of the Catholic Social Doctrine, and even in the fundamental writings of some of the so-called “intellectual fathers of the German Social Market Economy”, such as Wilhelm Röpke (1899-1966), Alexander Rüstow (1885-1963), Alfred Müller-Armack (1901-1978) among others.

In this paper, we want to contribute to the discussion on the definition of a fulfilled life by presenting Wilhelm Röpke’s concept of „rootedness“. “Rootedness” is a conceptual framework which regards the conditions for fostering largely autonomous, i.e. active – and not only passive – participants in the market exchange, and self-sustaining individuals and social groups. This framework makes a distinction between the state of pauperism, which consists in an existence deprived of the basic provisions for a worthy existence, and proletarianism, in which basic provisions may be given, but the individual is incapable of freely
pursuing his own well-being and contributing to the common good of society. Röpke bases his normative considerations on a particular interpretation of the four basic principles of the Catholic Social Doctrine and on a philosophical approach oriented towards human flourishing. In this contribution, we desire to discuss the usefulness of this approach which, following Rodríguez Luño (1996) we define as practical teleology, to widen our understanding of human well-being and to improve the development of those means which will allow individuals and social groups to achieve well-being as such.

Session 2b: Capabilities and Poverty

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Evolving Capabilities in Children? Importance and Requirements of such a Concept in Child Poverty Alleviation

The capability approach argues for understanding poverty as capability deprivation, questioning the monetary approach to poverty and emphasizing the importance of being able to choose a life one values and has reason to value. Hence it demands to see people as agents rather than patients in shaping their own lives. While there are good reasons to apply the same idea in the case of children, there is widespread agreement that a child’s agency is still in development. Thus, there is the question how and how far children can be involved in choosing a life they value. In the context of child rights it has been argued to involve children as far as possible while respecting their “evolving capacities” (Lansdown 2005) which vary with culture and individual characteristics. In the same vein, Ballet, Biggeri and Comim (2011) suggested the notion of “evolving capabilities” without, however, clarifying the content of the concept or outlining the differences between “capacities” and “capabilities”.

This paper discusses first the role of children’s agency for poverty alleviation. Secondly, we explain why conceptualizing “evolving capabilities” of children is important for capturing the agency aspect of their capabilities. Based on this, we put forward, thirdly, some requirements for the concept to work. Finally, we
suggest a tentative sketch of the concept and how it can be used to frame poverty alleviation measures.

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Individual capabilities vs. social exchanges: Discussing levels of agency and structure in opportunities and choices

Sen’s capability approach (CA) represents a new evaluative framework that has revolutionized previous accounts of social justice: one’s well-being should not only be assessed through one’s resources or realized achievements, but should also mirror the real ‘ability to achieve’ as the freedom to choose functionings from a set of alternatives. This paper recognizes that people are involved in exchanges to acquire resources or to function; these exchanges consequently affect the use and the extent of one set of capabilities. This paper argues that, to contribute to the CA, we should consider how people may be empowered through exchange as well as question the extent of their agency in that process.

Effectively, then, being opposed to designing just institutions Sen opts for furthering a constant critique of social arrangements – such as social exchange. Yet, he considers individual freedom of choice as central and views people as active agents in the process of change and empowerment. Consequently, any account of the process aspect of freedom tends to consider only the levels of agency (and contingency) involved in choice - rather than the ‘negative freedom’ of social structures. The CA falls short of providing a good understanding of capability for two reasons: it omits to explain both how exchanges mediate agency and how they structure one’s set of capabilities.

This paper investigates the social norms and patterns of exchange occurring in some formal and informal groups of a poor neighbourhood of the Bahia state capital, Salvador: a local market, a savings group, a religious community, a fishermen’s group, and a scavenger cooperative. First, it enquires into the association of distinct capabilities with exchange. Second, it illustrates the partial command that people can develop through exchange.
Responsibilities in the alleviation of child poverty: peers, brands and social exclusion

Without doubt, peers are of great importance for a child’s well-being and development. At the same time, there is evidence that children living in poverty, particularly young adolescents are often the target of practices of social exclusion. They make experiences of frustration, humiliation and misrecognition in their relation with peers, which can deepen and intensify their lack of well-being and have immediate effects on their scholarly development as well as long term effects on their self-esteem. Hence, peers play an important role in the poor children’s environment and can substantially contribute to both, the intensification and the alleviation of their living conditions. Specifically, in relation to child poverty and social exclusion and peers, the role of brands as a symbol of status and social recognition is crucial in children’s self-esteem.

On the one hand, the association of one brand and your social value can generate many conflicts and deepen the consequences of child poverty. On the other hands, publicists work for the brands’ demands and use well-known strategies in persuasion, which involves many times messages of social distinction. Do brands have a moral responsibility in relation to child poverty and exclusion between peers? Should those publicity strategies be limited, as it is done in relation to racial and gender discrimination?

Given the impact their messages have in shaping not only children’s prejudices and attitudes toward peers, but adults’ and parents’ assumptions, we will then scrutinize moral responsibility in relation to the consequences of the capitalist laissez faire debating whether brands should assume that moral responsibility or children should be hold responsible of their actions.
Session 3a: Conceptualisation of Poverty

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Quantitative Measures of Energy Poverty – Justice Sidelined?

Energy poverty (aka fuel poverty) is by now recognized as a problem even of advanced economies in Europe. Inaccessibility or high cost of energy services has long been a predicament for people in developing countries, but it has become increasingly clear that rising energy costs engender related difficulties in OECD countries. The UK was in the vanguard of this cognitive process, and much of the following is an assessment of British the of energy poverty. Two such measures have been officially accepted by the British government: the Ten-Percent-Rule (2001) and a Low-Income-High-Cost indicator (2013). The paper will discuss in which relation these measures stand to theories of justice, such as egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and sufficientarianism. It will be shown that both rules imply problematic violations of all these theories (and some serious conceptual shortcomings). Suggestions will be made, how this problem can be mitigated through modifications of these rules (which for political reasons are unlikely to be abandoned).

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The concept of Energy Poverty

Energy poverty remains a challenged concept without an accepted definition and established credibility in a public policy context. The main goal of this paper is to help close this gap. I argue that energy poverty should be understood, measured and addressed as a specific form of poverty. The reason is that energy poverty is independent from general (and income) poverty, related to non-substitutable and non-postponable basic needs, an urgent problem in both the developed and developing world and relevant for climate change and energy transition policies. I suggest identifying a person as energy poor if she (1) does not have access to adequate energy services or (2) cannot afford such services. This definition combines universality and adaptability to local circumstances. In outlining its elements, deficiencies of other approaches are highlighted. In contrast to the most prominent definitions on energy poverty, I argue that the con-
cept of energy poverty is not positional. Rather, it should be understood as re-
ferring to an absolute deprivation relative only to the level of development and
social standards of a given society. An additional major shortcoming in current
debates on energy poverty is that discussions on definitions, measurements and
indicators are not separated. The most prominent approach to energy poverty,
the 10% threshold, is often discussed as a definition but should rather be seen
as an indicator.

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Ethics in science: enhancing the democratisation of
knowledge production in transdisciplinary research
partnerships for sustainable development

Better access to knowledge and knowledge production has to be reconsidered
as key to successful individual and social mitigation and adaptation strategies
for global change. Indeed, concepts of sustainable development imply a trans-
formation of science towards fostering democratisation of knowledge produc-
tion and the development of knowledge societies as a strategic goal. This means
to open the process of scientific knowledge production while simultaneously
empowering people to implement their own visions for sustainable develop-
ment. Advocates of sustainability science support this transformation. In trans-
disciplinary practice, they advance equity and accountability in the access to
and production of knowledge at the science–society interface. UNESCO points
to advancements, yet Northern dominance persists in knowledge production
as well as in technology design and transfer. Further, transdisciplinary practice
remains experimental and hampered by inadequate and asymmetrically equip-
ped institutions in the North and South and related epistemological and opera-
tional obscurity.

To help identify clear, practicable transdisciplinary approaches, I recom-
mend examining the institutional route – i.e., the learning and adaptation pro-
cess – followed in concrete cases. The transdisciplinary Eastern and Southern
Africa Partnership Programme (1998–2013) is a case ripe for such examination.
Understanding transdisciplinarity as an integrative approach, I highlight ESAPP’s
three key principles for a more democratised knowledge production for sustain-
able development: (1) integration of scientific and “non-scientific” knowledge
systems; (2) integration of social actors and institutions; and (3) integrative le-
arning processes. The analysis reveals ESAPP’s achievements in contributing to
more democratic knowledge production and South ownership in the realm of sustainable development.

Session 3b: Responsibilities towards the Poor

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Who owes what to the very poor? Towards a conception of meta-responsibility

Iris M. Young in her late work, Responsibility for Justice (2011), gives an account of social phenomenons like housing deprivation, or some kinds of exploitation that, she claims, are the consequence of structural injustices. They are not the product of individual wrongful acts or of individual negligence but of something more complex; social processes with multiple factors, that the usual models of responsibility, that she calls liability models, are unable to grasp. She puts forward a different one, the social connexion model of responsibility. Young claims, following her model, that citizens that participated in a process, buying a product for example, that produces an injustice have a responsibility towards him even if the buyer is not guilty of the exploitation (there would be the case under the liability model which could be used to judge the factory owner, for example). So, she argues, we can explain why some citizens, the better off, have duties towards the worst off citizens of a society or towards poor people of other countries. The purpose of her paper is twofold: I will first try to show that Young’s ideas are not entirely sound and then I will try to think them over through Frazer’s concept of meta-political injustice in order to formulate a concept of meta-responsibility. I will begin her considerations by laying down some basic elements and assumptions concerning the situation of global poverty and by sketching two traditional views on responsibility. I will go forth and try to present Young’s model and then try to cast a shadow of doubt over it. In the final section of the paper I’ll try to articulate Fraser’s idea of meta-injustice with the social connection model and thanks to her I might be able to claim that we can be hold responsible, as citizens, for our own irresponsibility, for the fact that we are able to contribute with injustice without being responsible for it
**Cosmopolitanism and compatriot partiality**

Cosmopolitans who argue that compatriot partiality is like racial partiality capture something correct about compatriot partiality. However, I shall argue that the analogy should not lead us to comprehensively reject compatriot partiality. A closer examination of the development of slavery contains a justification for some compatriot partiality. We can justify compatriot partiality on the same grounds that black liberation movements have been justified. Hence, given cosmopolitan demands of justice, compatriot partiality is justified if the country it identifies is a developing nation. This justification is, however, incomplete because it justifies partiality towards oppressed groups per se. We need to further address the issue of how Person A, qua national of Country A, is justified in helping her compatriots in Country A over oppressed non-compatriots in Country B. I shall argue that Person A’s partiality towards her compatriots admits further vindication because such partiality is part of an oppressed group’s project of self-emancipation.

Finally, I point out three benefits in my account. First, my justification does not universally justify compatriot partiality. Given that compatriot partiality is like racial partiality, it is important to emphasize that compatriot partiality is not the right universal moral code for how we should live together, but only a temporary measure designed to level an unlevel playing field. Second, justifying compatriot partiality on the grounds I have identified is conducive to the development of democracy. Third, my account complies with the cosmopolitan commitment to the realizability of global justice theories.

**Structural Poverty and Precautionary Duties**

This paper considers the moral obligations agents have in relation to poverty. The paper argues that systemic poverty indicates social structural injustice. It proposes that those who make on-going contributions to social structures have an obligation to make reasonable efforts to ensure they are just. It explains that these efforts are required as a necessary precaution to avoid contributing to essentially aggregative harm. It is suggested that these duties require agents to work together with others to prevent poverty through structural change.
Building on the work of Iris Young systemic poverty is described as a form of structural injustice (Young, 2011). Structural poverty is modeled as an essentially aggregative harm (Lichtenberg, 2010). I argue that it is a phenomenon that results from a range of different factors coming together but which cannot be satisfactorily reduced to a number of distinct acts of harming.

The paper then considers what obligations those who contribute to such harm have. Iris Young’s account of essentially shared forward looking responsibility is critically considered. It is agreed that social connection to structural poverty is significant and that those who are socially connected to the processes that contribute to poverty must work together to regulate action and organize so as to prevent such poverty from emerging. However, I argue that this obligation should be understood as a precautionary duty which demands that individuals make efforts to collectivize and then act so as to prevent the continuation of structural poverty (Kahn, Forthcoming)(Collins, 2013).

Session 4a: Relative Poverty

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Relative poverty, absolute poverty and the unjust background structure

When philosophical papers discuss poverty, its alleviation and justice, they normally limit themselves to the problem of absolute poverty and do not deal with relative poverty, which often is seen as some kind social inequality only and not a form of real poverty. In my paper I want to argue that this is a mistake, that relative poverty indeed is real poverty and that it is unjust not to eliminate it where possible. Moreover I will argue that bringing absolute and relative poverty together as two different kinds of poverty will strengthen and not weaken the political case for battling poverty worldwide by changing the unjust background structure.

In the first and more philosophical part of the paper I want to establish the relation between absolute and relative poverty by arguing that both really are forms of poverty. In my conceptualization of poverty people are poor when they lack the material means to live a decent life. People are poor in absolute terms when the lack the material means to live a decent life in any given society. People are poor in relative terms when they lack the material means to live a decent life in their actual society.
In the second and more political part of the paper I want to argue that bringing relative and absolute poverty together does not weaken, but strengthens the case for battling poverty worldwide. This is so because it shows that people in all countries, even the rich highly industrialized countries of the north, suffer from an unjust economic background structure. Therefore they are natural allies in a political struggle for a more just political and economic order where poverty alleviation is a first priority.

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Sorting out ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ poverty

At first glance, the distinction between ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ poverty seems to be clear, with no need for further consideration. A typical example of a relative conception of poverty is the poverty line used by the European Union – in Germany the so-called ‘sociocultural minimum’. According to this conception a person is ‘poor’ if she disposes of less than 60 percent of the net equivalent income of her country. By contrast, a typical example of an absolute understanding of poverty is the minimum share of goods (like food, shelter, or medical services) that a person needs in order to secure her survival irrespective of the shares of others. On closer inspection, however, it turns out that the (alleged) contraposition of relative and absolute poverty is in need of further clarification. It involves a number of different conceptual distinctions addressing different aspects of a poverty conception. Indeed, with regard to the currently most discussed theories of poverty (the capability-approach, the basic needs-approach, desire- or resource-based approaches) it is not as clear, as it may appear, whether one deals with an absolute or a relative conception of poverty. In my presentation I shall discuss these problems and give a systematic account of the different relative and absolute aspects of poverty. Furthermore, I shall argue (following at this point Amartya Sen) that all morally adequate conceptions of poverty combine absolute and relative components.Session 4b: Tax and Regulation
Many societies are not very good at securing the right to health care for all, a fact that has recently been recognised by the Newcastle Fairness Commission, a group of 18 people who were invited by the City Council of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, a city in the North-east of England, to prepare a report with the aim to set out the principles that would help Newcastle to become a fairer city. Their report was published in 2012. It recognised that Newcastle is a relatively poor city.

In order to address this situation, the Newcastle Fairness Commission develops a particular conception of fairness with the aim to reduce inequalities. This article questions the concept of fairness that is advocated by the Newcastle Fairness Commission, and argues that local, national, and international fairness cannot be established without a serious commitment to radical reductions in pay inequalities. I argue that fairness requires a radical revaluation of paid and unpaid work in line with a qualified ‘equal pay for equal time’ principle. This proposal defends the implementation of an equal default wage within organisations, where deviations from the baseline are justified by reference to morally relevant considerations related to these factors: unpaid work; accrued debts; unjustifiable historical over- and underpayments; living expenses; and efforts to contribute to the common good. Full implementation of the proposed pay system will increase fairness, thus helping to secure the basic right to health care both within and outside Newcastle.

Hourly-averaging utilises hour-credits conferred by employers and government agencies which indicate the time that someone has worked or been excused from working. Hourly-averaging bases tax calculations on the average hourly income of taxpayers over their entire lifetime. Calculating taxation on the basis of a lifetime-hourly-average is attractive to insurers for several reasons. It enables an earning subsidy for those who have had consistently low income over their lifetime, without expending as many resources on those with previous good fortune. It is an attractive means to tax the most fortunate more than those with moderate fortune, and differentiate those from people with low fortune overall but temporary good fortune. This enables very high marginal tax-rates (up to 99.99%) without the usual disincentive effects.

Furthermore, hourly-averaging is attractive due to its likely economic effects. Unlike other forms of taxation and subsidy, it does not encourage people to increase their leisure-time at the expense of economic activity. This lack of a leisure-substitution effect is what provides hourly-averaging with its advantages over other forms of taxation and benefit policy. Hourly-averaging therefo-
re allows more targeted redistribution from fortunate people to less fortunate people. In particular, fortunate leisure-lovers can often avoid taxation by working part-time, while less fortunate work-lovers usually do not qualify for benefits due to their reasonable overall income or consumption. The advantages of hourly-averaging listed would make it more attractive to hypothetical insurers, despite the additional costs of administering such a system.

Session 4b: Minimum Justice

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Distributing Welfare and Resources: A Multi-threshold Sufficiency View

Theories of distribution are multifaceted and must account for who should receive the benefits of distribution, what it is that should be distributed, and who does the distributing. In order to create an optimal theory of distribution I will analyze each of the three facets above accordingly: sufficiency versus priority, welfare versus resources, and telic versus deontic. As a result, my theory will be a sufficiency view in which there are two separate thresholds. One threshold will measure subjective welfare from a telic standpoint, and another threshold will measure objective resources from a deontic standpoint. I will argue that my theory incorporates what is constructive in both welfarist and resourcist theories while mitigating what is unappealing about each. In this paper I will discuss what is controversial about purely welfarist or purely resourcist theories. I will also describe what I take to be the most powerful objections to both theories: the expensive tastes objection to welfare and alienation objection to resources. I will then outline my own multi-threshold theory and argue that it mitigates the above objections by combining a telic, subjective welfare threshold and a deontic, objective resource threshold. By making the welfare threshold telic I am acquiescing that there is value in increasing subjective welfare while relegating this distribution to beneficent acts of individuals. By making the resource threshold deontic I am placing the responsibility of distributing needed resources on just governmental institutions.
A Decent Social Minimum as a Matter of Justice

My paper is devoted to a decent social minimum as a set of guarantees aimed at protecting persons from extreme poverty; ensuring their involvement in society and access to shared material and intellectual values; and, in the final analysis, providing the opportunity for their moral and intellectual flourishing. The human rights guarantees of a decent social minimum are at the core of the global principles of social justice and constitute a legal way of poverty alleviation. The first part of my paper will explore the definition of a decent social minimum and will analyze three levels of its interpretation in their correlation: (a) in legal and political philosophy; (b) in instruments of international human rights law; (c) in the practice of international, regional and national human rights courts and supervisory bodies. In the second part, I will examine two interpretations of equality – distributive equality and equality of status – and show that it is equality of status that underlies the demand for a decent social minimum and what rules of distributive equality derive from it. The third part of the paper will concentrate on a two-level model of responsibility for ensuring a decent social minimum presupposed by international law (the primary national and subsidiary international responsibility) and will engage with the topical question of contemporary theories of global justice: to what extent can citizens of the state claim the help of the international community when the state is not able to guarantee them, or avoids so doing, a secure access to a decent social minimum?

A Minimal Standard of Justice: the Alleviation of Harm and the Protection of Human Dignity

When talking about poverty alleviation one needs to ask what poverty actually is. Of course part of it is an individual fate. But by diminishing it to individual fate, one overlooks the social structures behind it. Especially when examining global poverty it is of utmost importance to analyse these structures in order to be able to fight poverty effectively. That is why we need the debates on global justice – to see this bigger picture and to determine responsibilities. To contribute in global poverty alleviation one task of ethics should be to find and substantiate a
practically oriented theoretical consensus by justifying a minimal standard of justice. This way ethics can pave the way for much-needed political action, as such a consensus can be transferred into practice more easily. My starting point for finding such a consensus is the discovery that there is broad theoretical agreement that our world is not fair, but no agreement can be found how a just world should look like. Thus we should look at the problem of global justice from the perspective of injustice and develop a vision of a less unjust world. My finding is that a less unjust world needs a minimal standard of justice in the form of a double minimum: the avoidance or at least alleviation of harm through structural injustice and the protection of human dignity of all human beings. This double minimum should be implemented in a decentralised global institutional structure.

Session 5a: Global Poverty and Justice

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Fairness, Global Poverty and the Self-Serving Bias

How should considerations of fairness influence our obligations to the world’s poorest people? In The Moral Demands of Affluence Garret Cullity deploys arguments of beneficence to defeat Peter Singer’s “extreme demand” and arguments of fairness to replace the demand with a less severe requirement. In the proposed paper I aim to demonstrate that Cullity’s argument faces a powerful challenge from recent findings in psychology.

A psychological mechanism that has received attention from experimental psychologists is the self-serving bias in judgements about fairness. This bias is a tendency to conflate what is fair with what benefits oneself.

Disputes about fairness often arise in complex cases because the parties to a judgment about fairness do not agree about which factors are most important and the self-serving bias is very likely to influence people’s judgements, resulting in heartfelt disagreement. Unnecessary complexity increases the likelihood that judgements about fairness are adversely influenced by the self-serving bias. Cullity’s complex account renders judgements about fairness particularly vulnerable to the effects of the self-serving bias. Cullity concludes The Moral Demands of Affluence with a discussion of kinds of “permissible expenditure” in the face of global poverty. I claim that the self-serving bias may have influenced Cullity’s own discussion. I hope to explore practical ways in which Cullity’s account might be amended to insulate it from the damaging effects of the self-serving bias. If
fairness is to play any part in determining our obligations to the global poor, it is essential that this issue be discussed.

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In Defense of Productive Human Rights

This paper defends basic economic rights and freedoms as core Human Rights. These rights, I argue, ought to be recognized among the most important Human Rights.

I offer two independent, but mutually reinforcing justifications. The first is based on the Interest-theory of rights. I draw on extensive empirical evidence from development and institutional economics, I show that these rights are necessary (though not sufficient) conditions for ending poverty across the globe. Together with their significant individual benefits, this satisfies the conditions of the Interest Theory.

The other justification is a so-called “linkage argument,” by which one class of Human Rights is justified because it is instrumental to achieving better protection of other Human Rights. I present empirical evidence to show that the protection of economic rights and freedoms is positively correlated to the protection of standard social and political Human Rights.

Together, these arguments show that the Productive Human Rights should be recognized as core Human Rights. They are among the necessary (though not sufficient) building blocks of societies in which the full productive force of citizens is unleashed in ways necessary for ending world poverty.

Session 5b: Global Poverty and Development

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Discourse Ethics, Political Justice and Global Poverty

A recent Oxfam briefing paper (Working for the Few) made headlines due to shocking numbers, which it used to illustrate the unprecedented extent of global inequality and poverty. More importantly, however, it contained a clear statement as to what Oxfam poverty researchers take to be the main cause of this development, namely a vast and growing inequality in political power. This gi-
ves empirical backing to the central argument that discourse ethicists and delibera
tive democrats, like Rainer Forst, have brought to the global justice debate. A mere focus on distributive inequalities and resource based poverty alleviation may suffice for the short term treatment of the symptoms of global inequality/poverty but it will not tackle the root causes: Firstly, the striking lack of (political) influence that citizens of the global south have on the very political, legal and socio-economic structures that shape their lives. Secondly, the inability (or lack of interest) of those living in wealthy democratic states to push their governments towards a foreign policy that prioritizes poverty alleviation and fair structures of global political and economic governance and interaction. In this paper I argue that an approach drawing on the Habermasian tradition of discourse ethics/deliberative democracy may help us understand both what is causing global poverty and what needs to be done to overcome it. Poverty, as I claim, is a matter of injustice, which in turn is a matter of an imbalance in (political) power, that is, of the lack of fair procedures of participation in public deliberation by free and equal participants. I address the question of how such structures may be created for every human being, both in ideal and non-ideal terms.

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In Defence of a Rights-Based Approach in Fighting World Poverty

The rumour persists that the moral challenge posed by world poverty cannot be reconstructed in the language of universal and general rights. Universal rights are rights of every human being, general ones rights against everybody. No matter how a right not to live in poverty is spelled out in detail, it implies in its morally substantial versions that others, the addressees of the right, have to act in a certain way towards the right-holder – and not just to forbear from acting. Insofar, the right not to live in poverty is a positive one. Contested is, then, if it is conceptually possible to maintain that everyone has a right against everyone that he or she acts in a certain way. In the first part, the talk will discuss the different arguments put forward in order to give a negative answer to this question. The most influential and, at the same time, most basic arguments focus on the directionality of rights, their being directed against the addresses of the rights. According to these arguments, there is no meaningful way to conceive of the directionality of universal and general positive rights. It will be shown that they rest on an unconvincing understanding of the relevant kind of ‘directionality’. Either they imply a highly controversial understanding of morality or they are
based on a concept of rights with severe shortcomings in other contexts. In the second part, a thorough reconstruction of the directionality of rights will be presented. This reconstruction will be based on the general debate on rights and on a broad view on morality and moral reasoning. Hence, the talk will reconcile the quite specific question in what terms to formulate the moral challenge of global poverty with the more abstract discussion on moral rights and moral reasoning.